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Introduction
F markets—the ongoing integration and growing interdependency of countries worldwide (Cavusgil, Knight, & Riesenberger, 2017)—
-
ization—has dramatically reduced the time required to transport physical 
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resources and to communicate information, thereby accelerating the inter-
nationalization of firms’ value-chains. Major prospects exist to optimize use 
of inputs (i.e., efficiency) and increase sales growth (i.e., effectiveness).
Yet, the integrated, interdependent, global economies also expose firms 
to heightened risks. The firm must assess the various environments (e.g., 
economic, political, and cultural) worldwide across all of the countries or 
regions in which it operates, or is connected to, to identify what risks are 
relevant to its operations. The range of such risks is considerable; therefore, 
this subject paper focuses on a specific type of country risk: terrorism.
The business sector constitutes one of the primary strategic targets of 
contemporary terrorism because attacking it can cause severe and cascading 
economic damages to the targeted businesses (Sinai J. , 2016). Firms are 
vulnerable not only to attacks on their own assets, but also to attacks on 
their suppliers, customers, transportation providers, communication lines, 
and other elements in their eco-system (Sheffi, 2001). Essentially, the firm’s 
integrated network of sourcing, production, and distribution, organized on 
a worldwide scale (Cavusgil, Knight, & Riesenberger, 2017), is especially 
vulnerable to the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. Accordingly, 
while the risk of terrorism precludes none of the firm’s functional activities, 
particular attention is given to adverse implications for the firm’s supply 
chain operations.
Literature Review
To provide a contextual basis for supply chain executives at U.S.-based, 
small- to medium-sized enterprises, a broad evaluation of contemporary 
commentary pertaining to country- and firm-level implications and corre-
sponding approaches precedes a pragmatic risk assessment and mitigation 
planning framework. First, country-level considerations are assessed. Such 
considerations include adverse implications for the United States’ econo-
my, infrastructure, and national will. Subsequently, several country-level 
mitigation approaches are reviewed, including regulatory, diplomatic, and 
military approaches. The firm’s understanding of country-level mitigation 
approaches is critical, not only to recognize the potential impact of political 
and legal environmental factors on the firm, but also to comprehend what 
role the firm may need to take in their application. Secondly, firm-level 
considerations are evaluated. In general, the firm-level adverse implications 
and mitigation approaches are more internally facing (i.e., pertaining to the 
firm’s value-chain) than the country-level considerations. At the firm-level, 
logistical, supply network, and technological implications are of focus, fol-
lowed by attention to the various strategic and operational risk mitigation 
approaches proposed by contemporaries.
Country-Level Considerations
Essentially, terrorists execute attacks by way of one or more of the fol-
lowing mediums: land, air, sea, or information technology. In the context 
of international business, the most concerning physical means is arguably 
an attack by sea. Nearly 80% of global trade is transported in ships’ hulls 
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(Sakhuja, 2010). Accordingly, countries have invested significant resourc-
es in maritime infrastructure, containerized trade, energy supply chains, 
information technology-driven cargo movements and processes accelerat-
ing financial transactions in order to harness the benefits of globalization 
(Sakhuja, 2010). But, there are also associated risks: several studies of mar-
itime security have identified vulnerability in the movement of oceangoing 
cargo in containers. Each transfer of a container from one party to the next 
is a point of vulnerability in the supply chain (Caldwell, 2008). Terrorists 
can target the container in two ways: (1) by tampering with a legitimate 
consignment, or (2) by assuming a legitimate trading identity and using 
it to ship a dangerous consignment (Marlow, 2010). The container could 
potentially be the Trojan horse for the terrorist (Traina D. J., 2010). Similar-
ly, other physical means of an attack, by land or air, also present significant 
threats; however, contemporary literature suggests the global supply chain’s 
foremost vulnerability to an attack via physical means is by sea.
Increasingly, terrorist groups are also utilizing information technology 
to carry out attacks. Terrorist groups and their supporters (as well as state 
sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran) now employ cyber weapons to inflict 
economic damage against their adversaries (Sinai J. , 2016). Potential targets 
include government agencies, stock exchanges, and other government 
and financial information systems. Further, not only are terrorist groups 
utilizing information technology to carry out cyber-attacks, they are also 
utilizing its offshoot of social media to spread propaganda. In effect, it has 
become increasingly unnecessary for terrorist groups to radicalize its adher-
ents and sympathizers at physical sites around the world—arguably, a much 
easier prospect for counterterrorism units to regulate. Instead, propaganda 
spread via social media acts as a means to radicalize followers from a dis-
tance. In fact, a ten-year study found that approximately 90% of organized 
terrorism on the Internet is performed today through social media (Marcu 
& Balteanu, 2014). Followers are spurred into action, to conduct small-scale, 
local acts of terror (e.g., recent mass shootings in San Bernardino, CA, and 
Orlando, FL, in 2016). Additionally, terrorist organizations use social media 
for getting information about their enemies; soldiers of the United States, 
Canada and Great Britain [have been] trained to erase their personal data 
from social networking sites (Marcu & Balteanu, 2014).
Accordingly, disruption to maritime commerce, information systems, 
or other resources by means of terrorism would have significant adverse 
implications for the global economy, its supporting infrastructure, and the 
national will of its citizens. Let’s explore these country-level implications 
and corresponding mitigation approaches.
Economic implications. Any slowdown or closure of a port has global 
repercussions as the gridlock would cause vessels to be unable to discharge, 
which in turn would cause ships to stop being loaded that are bound for 
the United States. Then the foreign terminals would begin to slow down 
because of the backlog, and finally the manufacturing industries would be 
forced to slow down production. Prices would soon surge to record-break-
ing levels on most commodities, and the end result would be an economic 
spiral downward for the global economy (Traina D. J., 2010). In a Booz 
Allen Hamilton sponsored simulated scenario, the detonation of weapons 
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smuggled in cargo containers shut down all U.S. seaports for 12 days.  
The results of the simulation estimated that the seaport closures could result 
in a loss of $58 billion in revenue to the U.S. economy along with significant 
disruptions to the movement of trade (Caldwell, 2008).
Likewise, attacks carried out by other physical means, such as by land or 
air, can also result in severe adverse implications for the economy. This was 
horrifically demonstrated in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, when al 
Qaeda’s airborne attacks against the World Trade Towers not only caused 
the loss of life of some 3,000 civilians (the terrorists likely expected thou-
sands more fatalities), but cost New York City’s economy about $83 billion 
(in 2001 dollars) in total losses, including both direct and indirect costs 
(Sinai D. , 2006). A less quantifiable consequence is that resulting from an 
act of cyber-terrorism against significant financial systems, such as a major 
stock exchange, or a critical interconnected infrastructure, such as the 
United States power grid. However, research by the security firm McAfee 
and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) posits a $100 
billion annual loss to the U.S. economy and as many as 508,000 U.S. jobs 
have been lost as a result of cyber-crime (Kasturi and Sons Ltd, 2013); while 
difficult to connect to specific terrorist groups, these are staggering figures.
Infrastructure implications. A nation’s critical infrastructure consti-
tutes one of the primary strategic targets of contemporary terrorism be-
cause attacking its key sectors and assets can cause severe damage to virtual-
ly all sectors of the affected society (Sinai D. , 2006). Of crucial concern is 
a cyber-terrorism attack on the United States’ infrastructure. The situation 
is alarming when one considers that America has many thousands of dams, 
airports, chemical plants, federal reservoirs, and power plants (of which 104 
are nuclear), most of which have integral systems controlled by sophisti-
cated computer systems or other automated controllers (White & Stratton, 
2003). The potential implications are wide-ranging, as one weak link in an 
information system could provide a terrorist organization access to disrupt, 
or even potentially destroy, a primary enabler of commerce.
Correspondingly, a terrorist attack carried out by physical means (land, 
air, or sea) would have adverse consequences for the transportation infra-
structure. Within days of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, manufac-
turers began to experience disruptions to the flow of materials into assem-
bly plants (Sheffi, 2001). At sea, terrorists have successfully attacked a range 
of targets, from poorly secured platforms such as oil tankers and ferries to 
making forays against highly defended warships, port infrastructure and oil 
terminals (Sakhuja, 2010). As most global trade passes by sea and through 
ports, and then is ultimately transported by land locally, the ripple effect 
of a terrorist attack on maritime infrastructure would be substantial. It is 
instructive to note that such disruptions may not be caused by the attack 
itself, but rather by the government’s response to the attack: closing borders, 
shutting down air traffic, and evacuating buildings throughout the  
country (Sheffi, 2001).
National Will implications. Terrorist groups believe that if the public’s 
national will is broken, then U.S. military power would be irrelevant (Harri-
son, 2007). Diminishing national will manifests itself in consumer behav-
ior after a terrorist attack. When consumers feel less safe, it changes their 
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spending patterns. Businesses change their investment and employment 
plans. Essentially, a lack of confidence negatively impacts growth (Sinai J. , 
2016). National will implications are generally a byproduct of every coun-
try-level consideration. For example, terrorist groups regard the financial 
sector as extensions of Western economic power and dominance (Sinai 
J. , 2016); so, a cyber-attack on the country’s financial information systems 
aims not only to generate adverse consequences for the nation’s economy 
and infrastructure, but also to impact the country’s national will—citizen 
confidence in the strength of its country and identity—by targeting symbols 
of the country’s national values and beliefs.
Regulatory approaches. Security for the global supply chain following 
September 11 has greatly improved (Traina D. J., 2010). The United States 
government has implemented multi-layered systems of security and taken 
regulatory action to minimize the prospect of another catastrophic terrorist 
attack. In an effort to strike a balance between the need for security and 
free-flowing maritime commerce, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
responsible for protecting the nation’s borders at and between official 
ports of entry, oversees the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
program, known as C-TPAT (Caldwell, 2008). The program implemented 
several affective initiatives. The first initiative was the twenty-four hour 
rule, which required shippers to provide more information about the cargo 
and a definitive address for the consignee 24 hours prior to the loading of 
the shipment at a foreign port (Traina D. J., 2010). Basically, shippers must 
prepare a complete itemized list of its containerized cargo. This informa-
tion along with current and strategic intelligence are the core elements 
of Automated Targeting Systems (ATS), a system that combines real time 
information from several CBP mainframe systems that filters this informa-
tion and provides a risk based assessment (Traina D. , 2008). Further, the 
CBP has implemented the use of non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology 
and mandatory exams for all high-risk shipments (Caldwell, 2008). These 
initiatives or policies are all general and apply across the board; in that 
sense they focus on the general threat rather than any specific one (Marlow, 
2010). Marlow’s viewpoint is notable, as literature suggests the program has 
faced management and operational challenges. Yet, there are potential ben-
efits for the firm, as C-TPAT also aims to secure the flow of goods bound for 
the United States by developing a voluntary antiterrorism partnership with 
stakeholders from the international trade community (Caldwell, 2008). The 
public-private partnership aspect of C-TPAT’s approach receives further 
attention in the firm-level considerations section of this paper. Traina sums 
up the country-level, port-of-entry, regulatory approaches well by noting 
there is no silver bullet in the securing of [sic] trade, but these measures and 
new policies in the future will continue to provide layered risk management 
without impeding the flow of global trade (Traina D. J., 2010).
Regulatory measures have also been undertaken to address the con-
temporary concern of cyber-terrorism. For example, the Cyber-Security 
Research and Development Act was signed into law in 2002. Additionally, 
the SAFETY (Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies) 
Act, which encourages the development and deployment of new anti-ter-
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rorism products and services by providing liability protections for both the 
sellers and the users (Close-Up Media, Inc., 2013), was also signed into law 
in 2002 as part of the Homeland Security Act. In doing so, the government 
has created an environment conducive to anti-terrorism innovation, to 
continually modernize protection of critical infrastructure vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks. The social networks have taken measures against the terrorist 
and extremist groups as well, defining usage rules that prohibit the use of 
their services to promote terrorist activities…however, there are difficulties 
in implementing these measures due to the impossibility of monitoring 
in real time the large volume of information generated by users (Marcu & 
Balteanu, 2014). There is a major gap here, as Marcu and Baltenau go on to 
note that the countering of terrorism in social media requires fundamental 
reassessment at the political and strategic level and at the level of fighting 
against terrorism, taking in consideration the development of social net-
works, which should not be neglected (Marcu & Balteanu, 2014).
Diplomatic approaches. The complexity of the problem facing secu-
rity providers and policy makers is that the combination of intersecting 
functional and institutional arrangements across the supply chain makes 
it almost impossible for a single actor within a single channel to effectively 
trace and monitor operations across different channels (Marlow, 2010). 
Therefore, the war on terror has required the full spectrum of diplomat-
ic, economic, military, law enforcement, intelligence, and public opinion 
networks to work together. It has shown that common interests, values, and 
a coordinated approach are critical to combat common security concerns. 
Further, it has emerged that even a country as powerful as the United States 
needs international support to obtain intelligence, undertake surveillance, 
track terrorists, and physically reach its enemies (Sakhuja, 2010).
An example is the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which placed CBP 
staff at designated foreign seaports to work with its foreign counterparts to 
inspect high-risk cargo for weapons of mass destruction before the cargo is 
shipped to the United States (Caldwell, 2008). This has been implemented 
through bilateral agreements allowing both nations to send inspectors to 
the other country to inspect containers (Marlow, 2010). Specifically, the 
program has placed officers in 58 foreign ports to work with customs offi-
cials of the host countries to inspect almost 90 percent of the cargo (Traina 
D. , 2008). States have established a number of maritime arrangements that 
pivot on joint operations, multilateral exercises, intelligence sharing, train-
ing, and capacity building (Sakhuja, 2010). The U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) agency has offered reciprocity agreements with all the 
participating states and some have taken advantage of this opportunity.  
In addition, CBP shares information with all the participating states 
(Traina D. J., 2010).
Dr. Joshua Sinai proposes a Framework for Critical Infrastructure Resil-
ience to Terrorism in which diplomatic collaboration is necessary. He con-
tends that the overall strategic goal of homeland security is for a nation to 
build up its resilience to terrorism by effectively implementing six mission 
areas: the pre-incident components of (1) anticipation, (2) preparation, (3) 
prevention, and (4) protection, and the post-incident components of (5) 
response and (6) recovery (Sinai D. , 2006). The aforementioned regulatory 
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and diplomatic initiatives primarily address the anticipation, preparation, 
and prevention elements, which are of primary concern in the context of 
this paper. Dr. Sinai concludes that these are exceedingly complex, difficult, 
and costly missions that require coordinated, integrated, and focused efforts 
from all sectors in society, involving a country’s federal government, state 
and local governments, the private sector, the population, and the interna-
tional community (Sinai D. , 2006).
Military approaches. Popular wisdom repeatedly recites that the war on 
terrorism is unlike any past war. But popular wisdom has not yet adapted 
to the most fundamental way in which this war is different. In fact, it is 
not so much a war as it is a new era of continuous danger (Sheffi, 2001). 
The threat of cyber-terrorism makes the prospect of a singular military 
approach impractical. Of most critical significance is military presence, as 
opposed to military force, near home-country ports of entry and critical 
waterways around the world. Appropriate positioning of Navy warships 
and other military assets assists the previously discussed regulatory and 
diplomatic approaches. The effectiveness of the drone strike and/or boots 
on the ground approach is questionable; while arguably necessary, its use in 
a vacuum does not appropriately address and mitigate adverse implications 
for the country’s economy, infrastructure, or national will.
Firm-Level Considerations
The preceding evaluation of national-level considerations provides 
context for the environmental factors and adverse implications facing the 
firm, as well as for the suggested approaches to assess and mitigate the risk 
and impact of a terrorist attack on its supply chain operations. But, how 
prepared is the firm? Helferich and Cook note the following: The typi-
cal large U.S. corporation has given disaster preparedness a low priority 
because of competing business issues, the lack of recognition of the true 
level of disaster vulnerability, and an assumption that the service and gov-
ernment sectors are responsible for disaster response. The threat of more 
terrorist attacks creates a powerful motivation for management to explore 
the processes to secure the performance of the commercial supply chain 
(Helferich & Cook, 2002). As this subject paper caters to small- to medi-
um-sized enterprises, it is arguable that such firms give less consideration 
to the threat of terrorism than its larger counterparts due to the proportion-
ately fewer resources available to utilize for such a purpose. Yet, as previ-
ously noted, firms are vulnerable not only to attacks on their own assets, 
but also to attacks on their suppliers, customers, transportation providers, 
communication lines, and other elements in their eco-system (Sheffi, 2001). 
Therefore, regardless of size, the use of resources to assess the firm’s individ-
ual situation is paramount. Additional resources for mitigation purposes 
will depend on the results of such an assessment. Accordingly, executives 
must gain an understanding of firm-level considerations via evaluation 
of contemporary viewpoints pertaining to logistical, supply network, and 
technological adverse implications and their corresponding strategic and 
operational risk mitigation approaches.
Logistical implications. The role of logistics has become increasingly 
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important for companies due to longer and increasingly complex supply 
chains (Christopher M. , 2011). Some argue the supply chain’s complexity is 
both its vulnerability and its strength (Harrison, 2007), as multiple modes 
of transportation may be available to the firm if a terrorist attack were 
to target one of the modes; that said, the attack itself is not the only con-
sideration. Measures taken by the US and other governments to improve 
homeland defense have burdened the global transportation system, creating 
longer and less reliable lead times (Sheffi, 2001). Firms must realize adverse 
implications may result from the attack, as well as the country’s response to 
the attack. Additionally, the firm’s supply chain practices, such as outsourc-
ing, single sourcing…and inventory reduction (Christopher M. , 2011), 
potentially increase its susceptibility to adverse consequences. Today’s 
global and highly efficient supply chains lack buffers to protect against such 
disruptions (Konig & Spinler, 2016). Notably, the culmination of these dy-
namics may have severe adverse consequences for the firm—particularly, its 
supply chain logistics. For example, a terrorist attack against a firm’s supply 
chain might cause widespread disruption to customer delivery capabili-
ties, leading to a loss of short-term revenue and creating a service failure 
(Closs, Speier, Whipple, & Voss, 2002). In effect, the longer the supply chain, 
and the larger the number of countries it travels through, the greater the 
potential impact to the firm’s logistics activities. Firms may experience loss, 
damage, or delay of cargo as well as loss of visibility of such cargo. Further, 
much depends on the firm’s foreign market entry strategy. The exporting 
firm relies heavily on the maritime supply chain for movement of goods, 
whereas firms that use a foreign direct investment internationalization strat-
egy may have more flexibility, depending on the location of the terrorist 
attack and the firm’s facilities.
Supply network implications. As organizations increase their reliance 
on integrated supply chain networks, they become more vulnerable to their 
suppliers’ disaster risk profiles (Lockamy III, 2014). Since September 11, 
many US (as well as European) companies are reconsidering the wisdom of 
using overseas suppliers. Offshore suppliers may be less expensive, but they 
require longer lead-time and may be more susceptible to disruptions in the 
transportation system (Sheffi, 2001). The firm’s supply network is generally 
impacted due to adverse implications for the firm’s logistical activities; how-
ever, unlike other impacted groups (such as customers), the supply network 
may not be as insulated by intermediary buffer inventory and other assets. 
Further, poor infrastructure and/or unstable political environments in off-
shore outsourcing countries may be less capable of mitigating or adequately 
responding to a terrorist attack.
Technological implications. The firm’s information technology infra-
structure is of upmost concern. For the past two to three years, cyber-at-
tacks and related incidents have been entering the global risks landscape 
as among the most likely and most potentially impactful risks – in North 
America, cyber-attacks ranks as the most likely risk by far (World Economic 
Forum, 2016). Attacks launched in cyberspace involve the use of various 
methods of exploiting the weaknesses of the computers’ security, including 
cyber viruses, stolen passwords, and secret entry software that allow the in-
truders to penetrate the systems without being detected (Marcu & Balteanu, 
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2014). Firms with sensitive intellectual property, responsibility for critical 
resource generation and/or distribution (such as electricity and water), or 
asset management responsibility for significant financial instruments are at 
notable risk. Furthermore, as firms increasingly rely on sophisticated, inter-
dependent, and connected information systems, any technological disrup-
tion could adversely impact the firm’s supply chain operations.
Strategic and operational approaches. Perhaps there is nothing the firm 
needs to undertake to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack on its supply 
chain operations, as John Harrison suggests by noting that continued 
emphasis on intelligence sharing, aggressive military and police operations, 
and restricting terrorist access to funds and other materials will be sufficient 
to secure society as well as the supply chain (Harrison, 2007). Most contem-
poraries disagree, however, and recommend a variety of approaches for the 
supply chain executive’s consideration.
The country-level regulatory approaches portion of this subject paper 
alluded to the prospect of leveraging public-private partnership to mini-
mize the threat of terrorism to ports of entry within the global supply chain. 
To expand, C-TPAT aims to secure the flow of goods bound for the United 
States by developing a voluntary trade community comprised of import-
ers; customs brokers; air, sea, and land carriers; and other logistics service 
providers (Caldwell, 2008). C-TPAT is a voluntary initiative, where organi-
zations that choose to participate by increasing security in the supply chain 
will most likely receive less scrutiny of incoming cargo (Traina D. J., 2010). 
Essentially, the government seeks to improve overall supply chain security 
by improving member firms’ security methods—enticing them to do so  
via incentive.
Other scholars also suggest firms embrace public-private partnership. 
Sheffi notes, recognizing the important role that government will play in the 
new era, and recognizing that government cannot do it alone, that corpo-
rate executives need to start considering the government, both federal and 
local, as a partner in corporate life (Sheffi, 2001). To elaborate on Sheffi’s 
overall strategic approach, to prepare for another attack he recommends 
firms analyze investments in three main categories: (1) supplier relation-
ships and awards, (2) inventory management criteria, and (3) knowledge 
and process backup (Sheffi, 2001). He goes on to recommend improve-
ments in shipment visibility, improved collaboration between trading 
partners and across enterprises, better forecasting through risk pooling, and 
further assumption of security roles and responsibilities.
Sheffi’s last point ties in with Closs, Speier, Whipple, and Voss’ A Frame-
work for Protecting Your Supply Chain, which outlines ten security compe-
tencies the firm should institute. The text notes, security competencies are 
created through the development of security capabilities such as infrastruc-
ture, processes, assets, and resources that achieve and maintain supply chain 
security. Security competencies include: 1) Process Strategy; 2) Process 
Management; 3) Infrastructure Management; 4) Communication Manage-
ment; 5) Management Technology; 6) Process Technology; 7) Metrics; 8) 
Relationship Management; 9) Service Provider Collaboration Management; 
and 10) Public Interface Management (Closs, Speier, Whipple, & Voss, 
2002). Effectively, the authors offer a framework to guide implementation.
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Another perspective is that of Chang, Ellinger, and Blackhurst, who 
present a succinct comparison of the characteristics of the different supply 
chain mitigation strategies that are identified in the extant SCRM litera-
ture: redundancy vs. flexibility, buffering vs. bridging, hedging vs. control, 
and increased capacity vs. increased responsiveness (Chang, Ellinger, & 
Blackhurst, 2015). Fundamentally, each dichotomy is a mirror to the others. 
Redundancy approaches focus on limiting or mitigating the negative effects 
of risk by increasing product availability by keeping some resources in 
reserve to be used in case of a disruption (Chang, Ellinger, & Blackhurst, 
2015), whereas flexibility approaches involve building organizational and 
inter-organizational capabilities to sense threats to supply continuity and to 
respond to them quickly (Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010).
Conversely, Christopher and Holweg propose adjusting the traditionally 
rigid supply chain model to one of structural flexibility, which refers to the 
ability of the supply chain to adapt to fundamental changes in business 
environment (Christopher & Holweg, 2011). The authors outline approach-
es that exhibit structural flexibility, such as dual sourcing, asset sharing, 
flexible labor arrangements, rapid manufacture, outsourcing, and use of 
alternate distribution channels, all of which merit consideration to coun-
teract the adverse implications of a terrorist attack. There are other strategic 
approaches, such as Hale and Moberg’s secure site location decision process 
(Hale & Moberg, 2005). Yet, as Sinai notes, terrorist threats do not affect all 
businesses alike (Sinai J. , 2016). The applicability of each risk mitigation 
approach is quite dependent on the individual firm’s situation. Accordingly, 
supply chain executives should consider a pragmatic risk assessment and 
mitigation planning framework to evaluate the firm’s individual situation.
A Pragmatic Risk Assessment and Mitigation Planning Framework
 
Contemporaries suggest a combination of public-private partnerships to 
proactively reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack, and the implemen-
tation of operational redundancies (assets and infrastructure) to minimize 
its impact to ongoing business operations. While perhaps these approach-
es may be appropriate, supply chain executives require a framework to 
adequately assess the firm’s individual situation. Accordingly, the following 
managerial framework adapts existing and presents new risk assessment 
and risk mitigation planning approaches for the supply chain executive’s 
pragmatic use. The framework progresses through three phases: 1) the busi-
ness aspects evaluation phase wherein firm-level attributes are weighed; 2) 
the supply chain aspects evaluation phase wherein supply chain characteris-
tics are assessed; and 3) the mitigation planning phase wherein the business 
and supply chain aspects output the suggested level of intensity the firm’s 
mitigation plan should assume.
1. Business Aspects Evaluation
Assesses, by way of numerical weighting, firm-level attributes that influ-
ence the firm’s susceptibility to adverse implications resulting from terrorism.
1.1 Business category (b). As Sinai points out, certain business cat-
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egories are of greater risk to terrorist attack than others. These include 
transportation (aviation, ground and maritime), energy (nuclear power, oil 
and gas facilities, and chemical plants), financial institutions (such as stock 
exchanges and banks), tourism (hotels and restaurants), and shopping malls 
(Sinai J. , 2016). Based on this context, assign a value to this aspect between 
zero (0) and ten (10), where zero (0) represents the lowest risk-level and ten 
(10) represents the highest level of risk.
1.2 Customer distance (d). Not dissimilar to the business category, the 
firm’s distance from the customer is also of concern. For example, service 
industries such as tourism are generally fulfilling customer requirements 
more closely in terms of space and time than low-tier manufacturers of 
goods, which may be several levels removed from the end consumer. There 
are additional security cost and brand equity considerations the short cus-
tomer distance firm must consider. Therefore, assign a value to this aspect 
between zero (0) and five (5), where zero (0) represents a long customer 
distance and five (5) represents a short customer distance.
 1.3 Level of connectivity (n). Another business aspect the executive 
must consider is how dependent the firm’s operations are on connectivity. 
In this sense, connectivity refers to the firm’s level of reliance on informa-
tion technology to conduct business, which if impacted, would create signif-
icant challenges to ongoing operations or business continuity in the event 
of a terrorist attack. Further, as Sheffi points out, corporations with several 
warehouse management systems, multiple order entry systems, or several 
incompatible manufacturing and financial systems, are more vulnerable 
than companies who standardized their operations and can move person-
nel and processes between locations if a single location goes down (Sheffi, 
2001). So, both the level of connectivity and the deviations between the con-
nected systems must be considered. Assign a value to this aspect between 
zero (0) and five (5), where zero (0) represents the lowest risk-level and five 
(5) represents the highest level of risk.
1.4 Level and type of internationalization (i). As reviewed, the focal 
firm’s level of globalization may correlate to increased operational risk. 
Further, differing levels and types of risk may result from the firm’s foreign 
market entry method. For example, the exporting firm relies heavily on 
the maritime supply chain for movement of goods, whereas firms that use 
a foreign direct investment internationalization strategy may have more 
flexibility, depending on the location of the terrorist attack and the firm’s fa-
cilities. While they may have more control, numerous interconnected facili-
ties worldwide may expose the firm to threats unique to specific country or 
regional environments. Via critical self-evaluation, assign a value between 
zero (0) and ten (10), where zero (0) represents the lowest risk-level and ten 
(10) represents the highest level of risk.
1.5 Calculate the business aspects sum (BAS). Add each of the preced-
ing attribute values to calculate your firm’s numerical business aspect risk 
level. The lowest possible value is zero (0) and the highest possible value is 
thirty (30).
=Business category(b) + Customer distance(d) + Connectivity(n) + Internationalization(i)
2. Supply Chain Aspects Evaluation
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Assesses, by way of numerical weighting, supply chain attributes that 
influence the firm’s susceptibility to adverse implications resulting from 
terrorism.
2.1 Supply chain complexity (c). Essentially, the supply chain executive 
must assess both the length and the depth of its complete supply chain. The 
greater the number of countries it travels through, the more entities with 
which is interacts, and the more differentiated the product and service 
offerings, the greater the risk to the organization. Assign a value between 
zero (0) and ten (10), where zero (0) represents the lowest complexity and 
ten (10) represents the highest complexity.
2.2 Resource use strategy (r). Evaluate the firm’s general practice regard-
ing inventory and capacity. Does the firm buffer inventories and plan for 
excess capacity? Or, conversely, does the firm generally seek to maximize 
inventory turns and utilization of capacity? Assign a value between zero 
(0) and five (5), where zero (0) represents the former and (5) represents the 
latter.
2.3 Supply network characteristics (s). Assess aspects of the firm’s 
supply network, such as its ratio of offshore suppliers to local suppliers, the 
nature of contractual agreements with such suppliers, and its use of dual 
sourcing. Then, assign a value between zero (0) and five (5), where zero (0) 
represents low risk relative to the preceding, and other, considerations (i.e., 
low offshore to local supplier ratio, strong contracts, and abundant use of 
dual sourcing), and five (5) represents high risk relative to these character-
istics. 
2.4 Reliance on transportation infrastructure (t). Conduct an analysis 
of the firm’s transportation methods to ship and receive goods. Consid-
er breakdown by mode, such as land, air and sea, as well as by distance 
covered—are transports generally local, regional, national, or international? 
Give attention to frequency of shipments and receipts, as well as its relative 
importance to the overall operation. Assign a value between zero (0) and 
ten (10), where zero (0) represents the lowest risk and ten (10) represents 
the highest risk.
2.5 Calculate the supply chain aspects sum (SCAS). Add each of the 
preceding attribute values to calculate your firm’s numerical supply chain 
risk level. The lowest possible value is zero (0) and the highest possible 
value is thirty (30).
=Complexity(c) + Resource use(r) + Supply network(s) + Transportation(t)
3. Mitigation Planning
Lastly, add the business aspects sum (BAS) to the supply chain aspects 
sum (SCAS) to derive an overall numerical risk level (ONRL). See Table 1 
for the suggested level of intensity the firm’s mitigation plan should assume, 
and recommended action, based on the total.
ONRL = Business aspects sum (BAS) + Supply chain aspects sum (SCAS) References 
Limitations and Conclusions
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The preceding framework is intended for pragmatic use, hence its 
simplicity. The inherent simplicity of the framework, however, may limit 
its use in actual practice. The framework was developed via culmination of 
observed research and the author’s practical experiences as a supply chain 
executive. Accordingly, a wide range of country- and firm-level consid-
erations are reviewed to cater to a wide audience of executives in various 
industries and contexts. The framework, in turn, serves to help shape the 
user’s thought process, especially regarding risk assessment. A limitation is 
the potential for one or two aspects to disproportionately skew the overall 
numerical risk level. The reader must recognize this possibility, and adjust 
accordingly. Further, the reader is expected to utilize the information herein 
as a basis for further research, upon proper identification of the firm’s most 
prevalent risks. While the paper considered a broad review of literature, 
some adverse implications and mitigation approaches received more atten-
tion than others.
In conclusion, if the key to business success is superior efficiency and 
effectiveness relative to one’s competitors, and the globalization of markets 
provides internationalizing firms the opportunity to augment these factors, 
such firms must give proper attention to the risks prevalent in international 
business, not least of which is the country risk of terrorism.
ONRL
Suggested 
Response 
Level
Recommended Action
25-30 Intensive Allocate significant resources to address.
20-24 High Identify highest risk areas to address.
16-19 Moderate Conduct cost-benefit analysis first.
12-15 Low Consider based on available resources.
0-11 None Negligible risk level - no action required.
Table 1. Mitigation Planning – Suggested Response Level
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